Posted by
Andrews on Tuesday, June 17, 2008 5:02:48 PM
As the subject of mental illness has come up several times in recent
essays, I think it is time for me to clarify my position. I have
several times made mention of the fact that I have some problems with
current views and so I feel I should probably explain why. It also will
make much easier when I finally write on my thoughts about the problem
of involuntary commitment and other mental health issues.
My first problem is that there are no real objective diagnostic
criteria. While some postulate a physical or genetic cause, the fact
remains that, outside of a few dementias, we have found physical
markers for none of our mental illnesses. Which means that diagnosis is
based on arbitrary criteria. And more than that. Arbitrary criteria
which cannot even be quantified.
And that is the real difference. You see, I am sure when I mentioned
arbitrary criteria, some clever person would mention that a blood sugar
of , say 60, is arbitrarily set as the cutoff for a "low" value. And it
is true that what is the borderline for high and low is something of an
arbitrary choice. But he difference is that there is still a blood
sugar to measure, and numbers can be compared, values can be measured
and so on. We can describe physical conditions at various numeric
values.
Can we do that with sadness? What value of sadness is too sad? When does depression become an illness?
But it is not just the lack of quantification, it is also the fact that
these supposed illnesses are just exaggerations of normal behavior, or
even behaviors which could be normal in other contexts. If I am sad the
day after my wife dies, most agree it is normal. If I am just as sad a
week later, it is ok for most. A month, maybe. A year, and many think I
have a problem.
And therein lies the problem. Some would and some wouldn't. Whether I
am just sad or clinically depressed in the end comes down to judgment
call on the part of the therapist, and is based more on what the
cultural norms say about depression than any real diagnostic criteria.
But, in my mind at least, cultural norms do not an illness create.
Which means mental illness is more in the nature of behavior than an
illness. When we say someone is mentally ill, more often than not we
simply mean he has transgressed too far against our cultural norms.
And that isn't an illness. And it certainly doesn't sound like something biological in origin.
Now, usually by the time I reach this point, someone who has a friend
or family member with a problem becomes offended and says "If you knew
someone with [whatever] you wouldn't doubt it was a real disease!" Or
maybe "it was biological!" But the truth is I have known many people
with mental disorders, yet that does not change the facts. Mental
illnesses are basically either an inability to meet certain social
norms or the exaggeration of a specific trait or behavior. Why must
that be a disease and not just a sign of normal human variability? We
accept that there are virtuosos who excel in positive directions
without calling it a disease. So if there are piano prodigies, why not
fear prodigies, which we call paranoia? Why must the bad extreme of
behavior be a disease while the good extreme is a virtue?
It seems to me that what we call mental illness is much more likely
simply a problem of behavior or acculturation, sometimes simply an
extreme of temperament, and in some case, simple play acting by
someone whose situation is improved by being thought "crazy".
Now, to blame much of it on aculturation and behavior is not to lay the
blame on parents, as was common in the past. Likely some percentage of
personality is innate, established form birth. And given that, an
individual's reaction to stimulus can be rather unpredictable, even at
a very early age. It also explains how two children from the same
environment can grow into quite different adults. Parents play some
role, but so does everything that goes into the environment surrounding
a child. Which means that the behavioral and cognitive problems which
we label mental illness could come from any number of sources, or even
from the interaction of several.
Now having said that, I am sure some will come back with some very
extreme example and argue that it "just couldn't be" due to behavioral
or acculturation issues. But that ignores how little change it takes to
result in completely bizarre behavior. For example, try this tomorrow.
Whenever anyone uses a word beginning with the letter S take great
offense. It is but one small change, a simple matter of a strange
connotation no one expects or shares with you, but see how bizarre your
behavior becomes. If that one small change can make you seem completely
erratic, then imagine someone with a library of literally hundreds of
idiosyncratic connotations, who has their own personal set of meanings
attached to actions or words.
Now, I am not arguing here for a return to General Semantics, arguing
that all of mental illness is a linguistic phenomenon. But I do think
that added or missing connotations for words can explain much of the
strange verbal and emotional behavior exhibited by some. Of course,
that is not the only cause. A failure to understand rules of reasoning
and association can be another. Psychiatrists even seem to recognize
this, pointing out the superficial way schizophrenics associate ideas,
yet they do not make the logical conclusion that schizophrenics simply
don't know how to properly link ideas, and instead see it as a symptom.
On top of this we can add extremes of personality, including an excess
or lack of affect, as well as poor control of impulses, and maybe poor
understanding of behavioral norms, and we can find an explanation for
nearly everything that we are told is the result of "mental illness".
It is less comforting to think that the crazy person is that way simply
because he never learned what he needed to behave better. It makes us
feel better to think he is sick. But just because something is
comforting does not make it true.
POSTSCRIPT
Many will argue that I can't be right because psychological drugs "work".
I would argue that many work only in a very vague sense. For
example potent sedatives do make some pliable and docile, but that does
not mean they are cured, just drugged.
Others work, but not for the reason supposed. For example, many
supposed anti-depressants (eg Paxil) are also sometimes abused for
their euphoric effect. Is it any wonder that a euphoria producing drug
will make people less depressed? That shows nothing about serotonin or
dopamine. It just proves getting high makes people feel better for a
time.Likewise, drugs which have a stimulant effect tend to be
prescribed to those with lethargy, and not surprisingly have some
beneficial effect. In the long run, a lot of psych drugs differ from
self-medication with illegal drugs only in the view of the law.
But even those cases where a drug does not produce euphoric or
stimulant effects and yet serves to elevate mood, that does nothing to
prove problems are an "illness". The fact that inducing chemical change
in the mind can effect mood proves nothing it all, except that mood,
like all thought, is an electrochemical process. We know that. But it
says nothing about the origin of depressions, autism, or any other
disorder.
NOTE: As this is relevant for both of my blogs, it has been simultaneously posted on
Random Notes and
Examining the War on Drugs.
ADDENDUM
In some ways my thoughts mirror those of Thomas Szasz and Peter Breggin. I know that both are not held in high esteem by many in the medical community, but that does not mean they are wrong. While working in social services I had interaction with many supposedly suffering from mental illness and saw the supposedly minimal side effects of psychiatric medications. I also saw real organic brain damage while working with the retarded, so I have seen the difference between a real physical problem and the array of misbehavior and confusion we call mental illness.
Having said all that, I am open to the possibility that I am wrong, either in specific cases, or in general. Perhaps some mental illnesses do have an as yet unknown physical cause, but, as I said, excluding dementia of various types, I have not seen any persuasive evidence. And the ever changing genetic markers for schizophrenia have convinced me that media reports on the topic tend to insufficiently research before announcing breakthroughs.